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Abstract 
This study examines the post adoption of technology and explores why technology may not be 
sustainable in organizations after its deployment. In contrast with previous studies, which emphasize 
technology improvement, users’ post-adoptive behavior, and organization adaptation, this research 
offers a practice-based analysis and suggests that architectural innovations may bring about a 
fundamental transition in organizational practices and collaboration patterns. This transformation in 
organizational principles renders technology obsolescence, and precludes a superficial change in 
technological features. This case study analyzes an e-procurement system deployed from Taiwan to 
China and investigates why the initial success of technology use was not transferred to the later 
application. The technology use within supply chain migration provides a useful context to 
understand problems of technology sustainability. Important implications are provided to enhance the 
theoretical development of post technology adoption. Practical insights are discussed with regard to 
supply chain changes. 





Enterprises often spend enormous resources in building and implementing information systems to 
streamline their supply chain, enhance customer services and enable process innovations. Although 
they could overcome people resistance, contain implementation risks, align technology with business 
processes, and promote technology diffusion, the information systems initially built to support 
organizational practices may not sustain the new challenges brought about by continual organizational 
growth within the fluid business environment. In many occasions, over time, technology may become 
outmoded, post-adoptive behavior altered, and business processes changed.  
More importantly, the evolving technological environment may fundamentally modify organizational 
configuration as technological change renders an entirely new production model (Henderson & Clark 
1990; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi 1995; Richard & Devinney 2005). In this situation, advancing 
technological features may fail to align with the underlying shift in the organizing principles and 
systems of governance (DeSanctis & Poole 1994; Zammuto et al. 2007). Technologies may therefore 
become obsolete even when they are constantly improved and upgraded. However, the current 
literature has not yet explored this technology obsolescence issue in detail.  
For this reason, this study proposes the research question: Why may technology become unsustainable 
to support organizational practices, after successful implementation and use? Using qualitative 
methods, this study examines an adoption of e-procurement system designed to support a large-scale 
supply chain migration, from Taiwan to China. The findings suggest that technology can become 
obsolete not because of outmoded technology features but because of a fundamental shift in the 
collaboration pattern.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Is technology effective after it is adopted and used? Executives rarely consider this question. Most 
companies are more concerned with how to encourage technology acceptance (Lapointe & Rivard 
2005), minimize implementation risks (Markus et al. 2000), and enlarge technology adoption and 
assimilation (Fichman 2000; Rai et al. 2009). Their major concern is using technology and ensuring 
that it functions effectively as anticipated. Few executives consider whether technology is still useful 
and relevant after it is adopted. 
Technology visionaries suggest that migration of legacy systems is necessary so that technological 
application potential will not become obsolete and underutilized. Practically, such obsolescence is a 
result of technological evolution as newer technologies appear and older ones cease to be used (Wang 
2010). Moreover, the difficulty in predicting timing and costs of technology migration match the 
unpredictability of technological obsolescence itself. 
Scholars of post-adoptive behavior look beyond the ephemeral nature of technology capabilities, and 
examine the critical role of users in IT continuance (Karahanna et al. 1999; Bhattacherjee 2001). In 
this view, sustained technology must pay close attention to different stakeholder groups (e.g. end-
users, implementers, and managers) and their individual differences (e.g. age, gender, and education). 
This is because the way stakeholders make sense of technology (e.g. compatibility, ease of use, task 
fit, and social impact) during the post adoption period inevitably affects their subsequent behavior in 
adopting technology (Jasperson et al. 2005; Ortiz de Guinea & Markus 2009). Post-adoptive behavior 
analyses essentially examine what influences the degree to which current stakeholders of installed 
technology applications learning, use, and extend the full range of features built into these 
applications. The emphasis is on technology features and users’ sense-making (cognition). However, 
few analyses examine the IT continuance from organizational level. 
Technology also becomes obsolete also due to organizational evolution (Pettigrew 1990). This is 
because organizational structure, business processes, corporate strategy, and people’s roles and 
responsibilities may change over time (Scott-Morton 1991). In this case, technology adaptation may 
not keep abreast with organizational changes. Research on technology alignment also suggests that 
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technology should renew constantly to reflect changes in organizational configurations (Sabherwal et 
al. 2001; Soh & Sia 2004). 
Nevertheless, changing organizational forms and functions may not necessarily reflect the temporal 
shift in organizing principles, knowledge structures, and work practices (Orlikowski & Yates 2002). 
Meanwhile, the shift in institutional context could also invite architectural innovation and redefine 
production methods (Henderson & Clark 1990; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi 1995; Richard & Devinney 2005) 
which in turn reshape organizing principles and collaboration patterns. In these circumstances, 
technology designed to support the original forms and functions might fail to sustain new organizing 
principles resulting from the temporal shift. Hence, technologies become obsolete, not because 
systems are not updated in accordance with new business processes, but because of the incapacity to 
support new organizing principles and practices (Schultze & Orlikowski 2004). 
For this reason, a theoretical gap exists in the current literature. An important research endeavor could 
investigate how technology fails to sustain shifting organizational practices within a dynamic business 
context over time. This question requires a practice-based view which focuses on shifting practices 
and examines institutional environments which induce those shifts in practices (Orlikowski 2000).  
3 RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE: PRACTICE LENS 
Practices can be understood as ongoing human activities informed by shared institutional meanings. 
Studies on technology adoption have considered that the perspective of practice theory can be applied 
to explain the relationship between organizations adopting a technology and carrying out 
organizational activities. Overall, two approaches contribute to this relationship. 
The first approach is the point of view based on the embedded practices, as demonstrated in the early 
research of Barley (1986) and DeSanctis and Poole (1994). This approach views technology as a part 
of social structure, which influences organizational practice and the roles of actors in an organization 
when it adopts a technology. According to Barley (1986), the social practices are reproduced as 
technologies develop and adoption. Inventors are influenced by the societies they belong to, and in 
turn, they embed this social practice in their inventions. However, while technology is adopted by 
another group of actors, the embedded practice impacts the organizations or actors using the 
technology. Although this approach takes into account the social practice embedded within 
technology and its influence on the practices of organizations, it does not consider the continuously 
changing relationship between the institutional conditions and social practices (Bourdieu 1977; 
Giddens 1984). 
Thus, the second approach focuses on shifts in practice, and believes that, while the practices 
embedded within technology are the norms provided by technology developers for users to engage in 
action, the actual environments for organizations are continuously changing, and thereby the 
organizational practices are not static. 
More specifically, this approach divides the relationship between technology adoption and practice 
into two aspects. First, technology developers embed practices into technologies. Yet the embedded 
practices are only a set of behavioral or organizational models for actors considered applicable by the 
developers, which may include knowledge about how to precede a certain practice, resources required 
to complete the practice, and principles that should be followed during the practice. In other words, 
the real meaning of the embedded practices of technology is how technology developers expect 
organizations or actors to engage in practices based on their ideals.  
On the other hand, however, for organizations or actors, the real practices always change with the 
institutional and organizational environment. The practices fixed within technology can no longer 
satisfy the needs of organizations or actors. Under the circumstances, organizations or actors tend to 
form another system of social practice, which enables them to endure changes in the environment. 
Hence, no matter how delicately the practices are embedded within technology, to the organizations 
or actors, the embedded practices can not predict alterations in the institutional and organizational 
environments. Although developers can adapt the technology to match changes in the environment, 
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through functional upgrades or customization, no fundamental changes can be made to the basic 
structure of technology. Consequently, from the perspective of shifting practices, the inapplicable 
technologies may not arise from the undeveloped functions of technology or from the different 
perceptions of users. This is because the practice embedded within a technology, as an ideal 
behavioral or organizational model, has a strong assumption in terms of the model it offers; the model 
not only assumes the status of the institutional and organizational environments to which the 
organizations or actors belong, but also presumes the scope of the practice. In this study, based on the 
approach of shifting practices, the study analyzes why an e-procurement system can not be sustaining 
adopted with a change in the institutional context, and demonstrate how this system become 
inapplicable when there is a migration in the supply chain activities. 
4 RESEARCH METHODS 
The qualitative methods this study uses reflect an interpretative stance, which seeks to explore 
temporal restructuring of organizational practices (Klein & Myers 1999). The aim is to assess 
critically the taken-for-granted organizational phenomenon and underlying assumptions. This research 
examines technology sustainability in the post adoption period and suggests an alternative to 
understanding technology obsolescence problems within a dynamic organizational context. 
4.1 Research Setting 
This research focuses on a national technological initiative, called “Project Vitamin” in Taiwan. The 
project objective is to implement e-procurement systems to help manufacturers maintain supply 
chains efficiency, from Taiwan to China. Project Vitamin includes 15 key Taiwanese personal and 
notebook computer makers. Project Vitamin also implements RosettaNet to establish a data exchange 
protocol and uses SupplyLink (a disguise name) – an international leading software – to support 
procurement practices including order management, delivery, supplier relationship management, and 
payment management. 
The implementation and deployment of Project Vitamin was successful (1999-2003). The project did 
not encounter serious resistance and suppliers reported effective use of the system. However, the 
continual use of SupplyLink encountered great difficulties during 2004-2006, as most companies 
began to extend their supply chains to China. In the latter part of 2006, most suppliers only applied 
the system to coordinate administrative matters. SupplyLink, a system which promises to link up 
manufacturers and suppliers, began to ring hollow. 
Hence, an interesting question: Why did SupplyLink become obsolete and fail to support migration of 
the existing supply chain? The study examines this problem from a practice-based perspective, 
requiring an analysis of procurement practices before and after migration, and identifies the 
transformation within the organization’s collaboration patterns. Through the practice lens, this work 
gathered and analyzed data in the following ways. 
4.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
The fieldwork for this study chose NoteCom (disguise name) and traced their procurement practices 
along the supply chain because the firm is a major stakeholder in Project Vitamin, among the 15 
makers. Through a senior executive in NoteCom, I visited the MIS department and examined the 
implementation process and adoption issues. Knowing that the system, SupplyLink, would be 
transferred to mainland China by July-August 2005, I began tracing the transfer process with regards 
to the technology interface and adaptation problems. In tandem with tracing the technology transfer, I 
interviewed the sourcing and procurement staff to understand practices related to supplier selection, 
product categorization, and logistics (before the migration). Through the firm’s referrals, I visited 
their key suppliers to understand their daily procurement practices and later became acquainted with 
the R&D department to observe how components and suppliers are chosen within the product 
development process. By September-October 2005, I revisited the MIS department to obtain 
information about users’ post-adoptive behavior and business process modification. Subsequently, a 
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vice president from the firm’s Global Logistics Centre, who manages mainland China procurement 
operations, helped us understand the problems occurred in the China sites. Using face to face 
interview and teleconferences, I visited procurement people at China sites. This helped me appreciate 
the challenges of procurement operations in China and technology use problems. I also interviewed 
inventory specialists, and explored VMI (Vendor Management Inventory) practices employed in two 
major warehouses in China. 
In addition to these formal interviews, I also conducted participatory observation and examined other 
field-based data. For example, I obtained government reports from MOEA (Ministry of Economic 
Affairs) and III (Institute for Information Industry) to understand the assessment of Project Vitamin 
(four whitepapers). As an observer, I also participated in NoteCom’s procurement meetings, which 
helped me understand how BOM (Bill of Materials) is incorporated into the system, how procurement 
conflicts are resolved, and how cross-boundary collaboration occurs in situ. 
The data analysis paralleled the data collection process in a reiterative way in three phases. The first 
phase involved mapping the project’s chronicles, which traces the key events of technology 
implementation, user responses, and supply chain migration. While developing a good understanding 
of the project, this work began to investigate the procurement process in the second phase. Applying 
the practice lens, this work traced procurement activities, focusing on “design” (supplier selection), 
“buy” (material purchasing), and “delivery” (logistics). These three practices formed the core of 
supply chain procurement and signified the production model employed by NoteCom. In the third 
phase, this work analyzed data according to two periods: before and after supply chain migration 
(from Taiwan to China). This third phase identified that SupplyLink could not sustain NoteCom’s 
procurement operations, not because of offshore migration, but because a major technological shift 
occurred in this period – an environmental change which induced supply chain migration. A third 
round of data gathering analyzed how such a technological trend may impact procurement operations, 
rendering a restructuring of design, buy, and delivery practices. With the analyses, this study 
examined problems within procurement practices and their influences on technology use. 
5 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The findings include two phases, indicating changes in procurement practices. This arrangement 
elaborates major technological shifts in the institutional context and its subsequent impact on the 
collaboration pattern. The first section explains the case background; the second and third illustrate 
the shift in three procurement practices; the fourth section analyzes the impact of changing the 
collaboration pattern for technology use. 
5.1 Case Background 
NoteCom has provided ODM/OEM services to international buyers such as Acer, Dell, HPQ, IBM 
and Toshiba. By 1999, NoteCom participated in Project Vitamin and became a leading player. 
NoteCom spent 1.5 years (December 1999 – May 2001) for system implementation and another six 
months (May 2001 – December 2001) to ensure smooth adoption. In total, SupplyLink helped 
NoteCom connect more than 400 suppliers, coordinated procurement operations, boosted procurement 
efficiency and reduced administrative costs throughout 2001-2004. The heightened market 
competition required NoteCom to transfer its supply chain activities to mainland China, like many 
other manufacturers. Supply chain migration enlarged the production capacity scale and expanded the 
supplier base. NoteCom extended system capacities to consolidate procurement operations in both 
locations. The system was not unfamiliar to the MIS department and implementation took only two 
months to complete (July-August 2005). However, the system did not produce the former benefits for 
NoteCom’s procurement operation. The purchasing staff found the system “inapplicable” for 
supporting their tasks in mainland China. A purchaser explained: 
SupplyLink produced wrong purchasing orders. The purchasing orders were mismatched 
with our requests from production line requests. We could not modify the order because an 
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altered order requires a series of changes for all materials. We ended up using telephone to 
confirm purchasing orders. 
NoteCom subsequently adjusted the business processes and modified system functions. But these 
efforts were in vain. A senior executive noted his confusion: 
In Taiwan, SupplyLink effectively supported our operation. We have transferred the exact 
manufacturing processes from Taiwan to China. The procurement model remains the same; 
the only difference is that the scale of operation in China is larger. It is not really a complex 
system for us, and we have customized the system to fit our operation in China. Why is 
SupplyLink not working? It doesn’t make sense. 
To make sense of this confusion, it is necessary to look at the macro-environment shift and its 
influence on procurement practices. 
5.2 Period One: Before Supply Chain Migration (1999-2003) 
Institutional context: Generally, notebook computer production required more sophisticated technical 
know-how than the desktop computer, as it needed to put all components into a much smaller space. 
Resolving magnetic interference, heat emission, and power consumption thus became important 
issues for the R&D department. For NoteCom, the average product development cycle was about six 
months, and much time was spent resolving technical interface problems. 
During this period notebook computer construction consisted of seven main modules: CPU (Central 
Processing Unit), North Bridge, South Bridge, case (mechanical frame), motherboard (in which all 
electronic components are based), cooler module (e.g. fan), and peripheral devices. The first three 
modules formed the core product technology, which are circuitries embedded in micro-chipsets. The 
modules function as follows. The CPU oversees calculation and control, the “brain” of a notebook; 
North Bridge contains chipsets which process high-speed data transmission, memories, display and 
graphics; South Bridge holds chipsets for supporting data input and output (e.g. receiving data from 
the keyboard and sending data to monitor). These three core modules are connected in sequence, in 
top-down fashion: CPU is connected with North Bridge which connects to South Bridge. 
Specifications for the North Bridge chipsets are closely related to CPU, mainly produced by Intel 
during the early years. 
The technical capability of notebook computer production was relatively immature, compared to that 
of the desktop computer. Although there was market potential, customer demands were relatively 
manageable. Most international buyers relied on Taiwanese makers to develop new product designs 
and arrange production capacities. For NoteCom, difficulties mainly involved finding capable 
suppliers to participate in the product development stage.  The CPU experienced few problems, but 
how CPU connected with North Bridge chipsets and how effectively North Bridge chipsets could 
interface with South Bridge chipsets were major product design issues. NoteCom often invested 
enormous energies to resolve circuitry compatibility issues emerging from constructing CPU, North 
Bridge, and South Bridge. 
Procurement practices: In this technical and business context, NoteCom’s emphasis was on finding 
capable suppliers and collaborating with them to resolve technical design problems. Such problems 
were of major significance because NoteCom’s design engineers needed to work closely with these 
suppliers to design circuitry layouts so that CPU and North Bridge chipsets could work smoothly. 
This kind of collaboration was not limited to trouble-shooting problems but might also involve a 
complete revamp of chipset design (hardware) and re-programming chipset drivers (software). More 
often, suppliers might have to engage in detailed interface design. For instance, a change in a specific 
chipset driver in North Bridge might affect other electronic components in South Bridge, calling for a 
redesign of cooler modules. As a whole, design engineers were concerned with design compatibility, 
in both hardware and software devices. As an R&D engineer noted: 
In putting together a product prototype, we do not need a “cheap” supplier (i.e. offering 
low costs) but a “capable” supplier. The suppliers’ technical capabilities determine 
whether the product will work or not. They need to know how to work with us, understand 
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our design, and react to engineering changes as problems emerge. Even when we select 
general materials suppliers, we also evaluate their technical capabilities. For example, you 
may have ten suppliers offering cooler modules; but their R&D capabilities may vary. On 
average, for each material, we take only three suppliers, and we choose them solely on the 
technical assessment report. 
After the R&D department selected “capable” suppliers, the list was sent to the purchasing department 
for price negotiation. Suppliers included in the AVL (Approved Vendor List) provided detailed 
component specifications which were then entered into the BOM (Bill of Materials) in NoteCom’s 
material requirement planning systems. At this stage, NoteCom’s engineers collaborated reciprocally 
with different supplier groups to ensure “manufacturability” – that is, to validate that the product 
design was not too ideal to manufacture. If incorporating more advanced features was necessary, such 
as adding handwriting devices, engineers assembled an army of suppliers to resolve a more 
sophisticated technical design. As a result, suppliers frequently visited R&D engineers to explain their 
new product technologies so that these components could be procured by the purchasing department. 
Under non-disclosure contracts, R&D engineers transferred technical know how to suppliers to ensure 
minimal design incompatibility. Procurement mainly involved sending R&D engineers regularly to 
suppliers’ factories for knowledge sharing and competence inspection. One purchasing engineer 
remarked: 
We have a minor role to play in procurement. R&D people tell us which suppliers are 
chosen. R&D people call the shots. They visit suppliers on an ongoing basis to assess their 
production capacity, work environment, quality control, operation management, materials 
distribution, technical services, etc. With the data, we rate the suppliers to anticipate 
responsibility allocation in case things do not work well.  
Before migration, NotCom’s manufacturing was largely based in Taiwan, where the computer 
industry is clustered in the north of Taiwan. To react to fluctuating demands from buyers, NoteCom 
set up a quick response production model, illustrated by a procurement manager as follows.  
Initially a buyer may place an order with us. While filling this order, the buyer may transfer 
another order to us because another maker, one of our competitors, has some production 
problems. However, we do not have the materials to manufacture this additional order. So 
we place urgent requests to our suppliers to produce extra components, or ask them to 
source the materials from elsewhere. While filling the second order, the buyer might reduce 
the order due to unsatisfied sales in the market, while our suppliers keep fulfilling the urgent 
order. Since we cannot return the materials to suppliers, we have to ask them to send the 
materials to us for the next batch. 
To respond to this flexible production, NoteCom developed a “purchasing via forecast and delivery by 
JIT (Just-in-Time)” model. In preparing production capacities, NoteCom worked closely with 
suppliers to forecast total material requirements. NoteCom allotted a one-month lead-time for general 
components and three months for specialized materials. Therefore, when the buyer placed an order, 
NoteCom’s aim was to fulfill the order as soon as possible (before they reduced the order again). To 
smooth fluctuating material demand, NoteCom asked suppliers to look at the “big picture” and shift 
inventories to the suppliers’ sites. This model also encouraged suppliers to establish production 
facilities nearby NoteCom’s manufacturing base. Nevertheless, materials consumption was relatively 
predictable. 
Hence, NoteCom could act as a production integrator as most materials could be delivered in days (or 
hours). To make this an effective model, NoteCom relied on suppliers for quality assurance and 
timely material supply. Since NoteCom had established mutual knowledge with its suppliers over 
time, such “purchasing via forecast and delivery by JIT” was very effective to secure production 
efficiency. 
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5.3 Period Two: After Supply Chain Migration (2004-2006) 
Institutional context: 2003-2004 marked a major transition for notebook computer’s product 
technology. This transition included two driving forces: notebook computers’ rising demands and 
advancing product architecture. The market potential attracted major fabrication firms, such as Intel, 
AMD, VIA, and SIS, to invest R&D resources into developing microchips which are proprietary 
notebook computers. These chipsets were different from those of the earlier stage, designed mainly 
for desktop computers. The new CPU generations brought about standardized interface protocols 
(thus fewer problems incurred in integrating chipset drivers) and modular chipset designs. 
As a result, microchip fabricators developed official design guidelines for notebook makers and 
suppliers. These guidelines made it easier for R&D engineers to consolidate CPU with North Bridge 
and South Bridge chipsets, which in turn reduced the complexity of solving problems related to 
memory chips, heat sink, radiation, power consumption, and PCB (Printed Circuit Board) layout. The 
fabricators also sent out FAEs (Field Application Engineers) to help makers and suppliers resolve 
chipset design problems. The implication was for standardized product architecture and R&D 
engineers shifted their concerns from design-for-manufacturability to system integration issues. 
In the meantime, buyers’ worries also shifted from product reliability to production volume, as the 
notebook computer market enlarged rapidly. This pressure pushed down to makers and suppliers. 
Makers were not only concerned with the speed of filling orders, but also with their capacity for 
producing large numbers of computers for the market. 
Procurement practices: For NoteCom, the first impact of this environmental shift was product 
development. R&D engineers did not have to worry about compatibilities between different chipsets. 
The official deign guidelines helped them resolve these problems. As a side effect, the new 
generations of peripheral devices also followed the design guidelines published by microchip 
fabricators. As product architecture became standardized, R&D engineers did not have to employ 
specialized materials and components for product design. Nearly 80 percent of components became 
commodities. 
In early product development, component replacement (e.g. a chipset) involved design changes, 
which required redesigning product architectures and endless teleconference calls with different 
component suppliers. Worse still, it re-launched architecture design, product prototype, and technical 
testing. A change in any component involved technical reformation and supplier knowledge exchange. 
With new generations of CPU, which integrated most chipsets and peripheral devices, component 
replacement meant finding an alternative supplier responsive to material delivery and ensuring 
product quality. As a result, supplier evaluation no more depended on technical capabilities but on 
price, quality, services, and delivery terms. A purchasing manager explained NoteCom’s new 
practices in their supplier selection: 
Every six months, we conduct a major supplier review. Our department gathers comments 
from R&D and production engineers to understand suppliers’ past performance. This 
includes delivery agility, friendly prices, and market dynamic knowledgeability. We have a 
TQRDC (T: technical; Q: quality; R: responsiveness; D: delivery; C: cost) table to score 
their performance so as to reset out purchasing priorities for the next half year.  
The procurement engineers also took an active role in purchasing. After migration, total production 
capacity of the three China sites was four times larger than that of the Taiwan site. The key challenge 
was to expanding supplier bases with a larger production volume. As NoteCom moved to the Kun-
shan industrial park (central China), most suppliers also followed. Except for a few suppliers who 
established production facilities nearby NoteCom, most Taiwanese suppliers based themselves outside 
of Kun-shan for tax avoidance issues or cost reduction reasons. Procurement engineers worked with 
incumbent suppliers as well as new suppliers – including migrated suppliers and newly developed 
Chinese suppliers. The centralized procurement organization soon became ineffective. By late 2004, 
NoteCom established a decentralized procurement organization and split the two procurement 
functions – with “sourcing” (qualifying suppliers and negotiating prices) controlled by the Taiwan 
office and “purchasing” (arranging deliveries and monitoring suppliers) delegated to individual 
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factories. As most components became standardized commodities, the purchasing staff performed 
technical tests independently without calling R&D engineers and incurring product revamp. 
The new procurement organization also altered NoteCom’s delivery practices. The original JIT 
delivery model was insufficient for the expanded production scale. Especially the three factories in 
China had to cope with long-distance logistics for materials supply. For about 20 percent of materials, 
NoteCom’s purchasing engineers applied “near delivery” and worked with suppliers surrounding 
Kun-shan city. Each supplier assigned a liaison officer to each NoteCom factory. Procurement staff 
sent purchasing orders to suppliers and liaison officers at the same time. As suppliers used NoteCom’s 
factories for inventory, the liaison officers’ job was to ensure optimal delivery of materials in each 
batch so that each factory could maintain material inventories for a one-day stock level. 
For the remaining 80 percent of materials, NoteCom employed “far delivery” and outsourced 
inventory management to third-party logistics providers. This avoided complex domestic taxation and 
regulatory constraints. NoteCom collaborated with two third-party logistics providers to offer VMI 
(Vendor Management Inventory) services, called “hubs” by procurement engineers. NoteCom 
authorized the VMI staff to monitor the inventory. In this situation, NoteCom did not deal anymore 
with suppliers but interfaced with “hub” specialists to maintain a 5 percent stock level (ensuring 30-
day non-stop fulfillment).  
5.4 Collaboration Patterns and Technology Obsolescence 
The investigation of supply chain migration provided important clues for understanding post 
technology use difficulties. By examining procurement practices, this study identified three major 
shifts in the collaboration model (see Table 1). First, NoteCom shifted its “design” practices from 
R&D-oriented to production-oriented supplier selection. In the R&D oriented model, NoteCom 
engineers selected capable suppliers and involved them in product development processes, including 
extensive knowledge sharing and cross-boundary collaboration to deal with compatibility problems 
among CPU and components. 
 
 Period One (1999-2003) 
Before Migration 




Technological shift: Notebook computer 
product innovation was relatively 
immature, which is mainly transferred 
from desktop computers.  
Technological shift: The architecture 
innovation in integrated CPU induced 







 Supplier selection based on 
technical capabilities 
 Production-oriented 
 Supplier selection based on product 
quality and standards conformity 
Buy: Purchase 
practices 
 Selective procurement 
 Centralized organization 
 Free market procurement 




 Near range logistics 
 VMI 
 Offshore logistics 
Table 1.             Practices Before and After Supply Chain Offshore Migration 
This model assumed pre-selected suppliers, a preconfigured bill of materials (component databases), 
and a database designed to deal with complex system specifications. The definition of product 
specification for the system database involved reciprocal knowledge sharing between NoteCom R&D 
engineers and suppliers. However, this system became less useful when NoteCom needed to deal with 
constant changes and supplier base expansion, involving standardized product specification. In other 
words, SupplyLink dealt with data structure complexity while the new collaboration model required 
systems that could handle extensive database updates in enormous volume. 
Secondly, NoteCom shifted its “buy” practices from centralized to decentralized (and distributed) 
material purchasing. The original model assumed a socially embedded relationship with suppliers. 
SupplyLink, under this model, presupposed stable transactions within which purchasing staff’s role 
facilitated smooth transactions. However, the new collaboration model required purchasing staff to 
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play a more active role in supplier selection and deal with sophisticated inventory control to cope with 
production uncertainties. SupplyLink became too rigid for purchasing engineers to interact with 
constantly changing suppliers, resulting from quality conformity assessment – rather than technical 
capability evaluation. 
Thirdly, NoteCom shifted its “delivery” practices from JIT to the VMI logistics model. The JIT model 
assumed near-range logistics and frequent fulfillment capability. This is an end-to-end delivery 
requiring synchronous communication and tightly coupled operation (between production and 
logistics). For example, SupplyLink typically provided suppliers with a two-week production forecast 
and simultaneously informed the supplier of impending orders (for delivery in three days). This 
smoothed buyers’ fluctuating additions and withdrawal of orders. Suppliers constantly monitored 
order status through SupplyLink to adjust their production and logistics. However, VMI required 
handing over inventory management functions to an intermediary. Suppliers only needed to monitor 
the inventory level to arrange their logistics activities. NoteCom no longer needed to inform suppliers 
put them on constant alert for production fluctuation. Hence, SupplyLink was unnecessary for VMI 
delivery and suppliers. 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, the e-procurement system provided supply chain procurement practices; however, shifts 
in the institutional environment unexpectedly drove the product technology to undergo architectural 
innovation. This allowed the case company to develop a new collaboration model to respond to 
supply chain changes occurring in the environment. This situation not only rendered the original e-
procurement system useless, but its continued operation negatively impeded routine procurement 
activities. 
This case of technology obsolescence differs from the technology adoption discussed by past 
researchers. Past studies have found that organizations can constantly upgrade technical features 
(Bhattacherjee 2001), reassure post-adoptive behavior (Jasperson et al. 2005), and adapt technology to 
fit an organization to prevent technology from becoming outdated and ineffective (Majchrzak et al. 
2000; Soh & Sia 2004). These studies emphasize that if businesses are able to continually improve 
technology, users, and the organization, then technology can be continuously employed. However, 
these studies have not yet observed how architectural innovation may bring about a fundamental shift 
in the organization’s collaboration model and its situated practices (Henderson & Clark 1990; 
Schultze & Orlikowski 2004; Levina & Orlikowski 2009). Thus, in this case, even though the 
company strove to maintain continued progress in these three areas (technology, users, and 
organization), it was unable to prevent the e-procurement system from becoming obsolete. 
This study emphasizes that in addition to technology, users, and the organization, enterprises adopting 
a certain technology must pay more attention to the institutional environment and shifting practices 
(Orlikowski 2000). From the practice perspective, even though the organizational actors may have the 
ability to execute practices, organizations are still exposed to impacts or constraints from the 
institutional environment. Institutional pressures that stem from the external environment require 
organizations to meet environmental demands to achieve legitimacy and ensure their organizational 
survival. Thus, from the practice perspective, the institutional environment is a major aspect of the 
organizing principles behind an organization’s practices. Therefore, an organization’s practices must 
adapt to the pace and scope of changes in the institutional environment. Using this argument to 
examine technology obsolescence, problems in technology adoption not only occur because 
technology, users, and the organization cannot continuously improve, but also because of traction 
existing between the institutional environment and practices. This study demonstrates the temporal 
effect of technology adoption at different periods. 
The practical insight derived from this study calls attention to the change occurring in supply chain 
collaboration. Although this type of supply chain collaboration change was previously infrequent, in 
todays market environment it is quite prevalent. For example, in recent years, “NoteBook” has been 
repackaged into “NetBook” because of advancements in component technology. Methods in supply 
chain collaboration for “NetBook” may differ from “NoteBook”. Thus, when the original 
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collaboration practices in the e-procurement system are modeled in a particular way, can this old e-
procurement system also be used in the supply chains of new products? 
Previous studies have demonstrated that different products influence the arrangement and processes of 
a supply chain (Fisher 1997; Lee 2002). For example, linkages and operations within supply chains 
that manufacture functional products and those that manufacture innovational products will be 
different. A single-model supply chain would have difficulty supporting both traditional and 
innovative products at the same time. However, in this study, even though the same product, when 
changes occur in the product architecture, collaboration practices will vary greatly between before and 
after. Therefore, supply chains of the same product also have different collaboration models. E-
procurement systems cannot be utilized to support new supply chains, because fundamental 
differences exist in collaboration practices in the areas of design, purchase, and delivery. 
In theory, aside from complementing existing studies, this research provides a deeper understanding 
of the reasons behind technology obsolescence. These results also serve as a reminder to management 
to pay attention to the temporal effect of adopting a supply chain system. The core message of this 
study is that, although an organization may implement and use technology for the first few years, that 
technology might not always live happily within the organization, should the context shift. 
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